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LAW FIRMS, GLOBAL CAPITAL, 
AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 
Christine Parker* & Tanina Rostain**
INTRODUCTION 
 
Between 2001 and 2003, one of Australia’s “oldest, richest and proudest 
corporations,”1 James Hardie Industries, restructured itself into a global 
corporation headquartered in the Netherlands.2  In so doing, it reduced its 
tax liability.  It also “separated itself” from its two original Australian 
subsidiaries and the huge liabilities stemming from the business that had 
been the basis for its success from 1917 up until the 1980s, but which was 
also killing many of its employees and customers.3  That business was the 
manufacture and sale of the material that quite literally “built” a nation:  
“fibrous asbestos cement.”4
By the mid-1980s, the James Hardie group had already stopped 
manufacturing asbestos and was focused on other businesses.
 
5
 
*  Professor, Centre for Regulatory Studies and Law Faculty, Monash University.  
  In 2001, it 
had grown into a global corporation, with most of its business in the United 
States and Europe.  At least parts of the corporate group would, however, 
continue to face significant asbestos liabilities in Australia for years to 
**  Professor and Research Director, Center for the Study of the Legal Profession, 
Georgetown University Law Center.  The authors are grateful to Mitt Regan, Rob Rosen, 
Susan Silbey, and participants at the Fordham University School of Law’s colloquium on 
Globalization and the Legal Profession for helpful comments. 
 1. GIDEON HAIGH, ASBESTOS HOUSE:  THE SECRET HISTORY OF JAMES HARDIE 
INDUSTRIES, back cover (2006). 
 2. In 2010, James Hardie Industries Ltd. (JHIL) moved its headquarters to Ireland.  
Shareholders Approve James Hardie Move from Netherlands to Ireland, NEWS.COM.AU 
(June 3, 2010, 9:04 AM), http://www.news.com.au/business/breaking-news/shareholders-
approve-james-hardie-move-from-netherlands-to-ireland/story-e6frfkur-1225874842377. 
The version of the James Hardie story that appears in this Article is based on a compilation 
of sources. See HAIGH, supra note 1; Richard Ackland, Irresistible Charms, BUS. REV. 
WKLY., Sept. 29, 2004, at 50; DAVID F. JACKSON, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY INTO THE MEDICAL RESEARCH AND COMPENSATION FOUNDATION, vol. 1 (2004), 
available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/tep/45031; Elisabeth Sexton, Hardie Writhes in Self-
Made Circles of Hell, THE AGE (Aug. 21, 2004), http://www.theage.com.au/
articles/2004/08/20/1092972742166.html.  The Hardie episode was the basis of an earlier 
case study published by one of the authors in CHRISTINE PARKER & ADRIAN EVANS, INSIDE 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 237–41 (2007). 
 3. See HAIGH, supra note 1, at 1–22. 
 4. James Hardie began its asbestos production in 1917. Id. at 18. The first known death 
of a Hardie employee due to asbestos occurred in about 1961. See MATT PEACOCK, KILLER 
COMPANY:  JAMES HARDIE EXPOSED 49–52 (2009). The first asbestos compensation claim 
was filed against James Hardie in 1939. See id. at 54. 
 5. See JACKSON, supra note 2, Annex J, at 117–18, 121. 
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come.  James Hardie’s asbestos manufacturing business had been 
enormously successful, and Australians had become the highest per capita 
users of asbestos in the world.6  One out of three domestic dwellings built 
before 1982 is thought to contain asbestos.  By 2001, approximately two 
thousand asbestos compensation claims had been made against James 
Hardie.  Due to a long latency period, however, there are estimates that 
asbestos-related disease in Australia will not peak until 2020, with about 
13,000 cases of mesothelioma (a deadly cancer of the pleural lining of the 
lungs caused only by asbestos) and 40,000 cases of other asbestos-related 
lung cancer.7
Lawyers were of course needed to construct this global corporation.  
Their assignment was to formulate a series of legal transactions, designed to 
ensure that upon completion, James Hardie could legitimately announce to 
the market that it had “resolved” its asbestos liabilities and could now 
“focus entirely on growing the company for the benefit of all 
shareholders.”
 
8
The liability of a number of directors and officers of the James Hardie 
parent for making a misleading statement with this announcement—and 
hence, in one sense, the ultimate success or failure of the legal work done 
by James Hardie’s lawyers—is still being determined in an appeal to the 
highest court in Australia.
  When it later became obvious that inadequate provision 
had been made for the long tail of asbestos claims against the former James 
Hardie group companies—the funding provided to satisfy claims was 
predicted to have a shortfall of somewhere between A$800 million and $1.5 
billion—there was a large public outcry, and the legality of this 
announcement was disputed. 
9
 
 6. See id. at 117. 
  In another sense, it is already clear that the 
 7. Peta Spender, Blue Asbestos & Golden Eggs:  Evaluating Bankruptcy and Class 
Actions as Just Responses to Mass Tort Liability, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 223, 234 (2003). 
 8. See Press Release, James Hardie, James Hardie Resolves Its Asbestos 
Liability.Favourably for Claimants and Shareholders (Feb. 16, 2001), in JACKSON, supra 
note 2, at 29, ¶ 2.35 (announcing the creation of the Medical Research Compensation 
Foundation (MRCF), an entity which would be responsible for all asbestos-related liabilities, 
stating, “The Foundation has sufficient funds [through a one-time provision of funding from 
the parent] to meet all legitimate compensation claims anticipated from people injured by 
asbestos products that were manufactured in the past by two former subsidiaries of JHIL.”).  
Commissioner David Jackson later described this announcement as “seriously misleading.” 
See id. at 10, ¶ 1.15.  In Commissioner Jackson’s view, the James Hardie CEO and General 
Counsel had breached their duties as James Hardie officers “by encouraging the Board to act 
on the Trowbridge Report in forming a view that the Foundation would be ‘fully funded.’” 
See id. at 420, ¶ 24.82. 
 9. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission commenced civil 
proceedings in relation to this matter in 2007.  In 2009, the New South Wales Supreme Court 
found that seven former directors, three former company officers, and the former General 
Counsel of JHIL and James Hardie Industries NV (JHINV), had breached various duties 
under the Corporations Act in relation to disclosures made concerning the adequacy of 
funding made available in 2001 for asbestos-related litigation. See Austl. Sec. & Invs. 
Comm’n v Macdonald [2009] NSWSC 287 (Austl.).  In 2010, the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal dismissed the appeal by JHINV, upheld the appeals by the non-executive directors, 
and dismissed in part and upheld in part the appeals by the executive officers. See Morley & 
Ors v Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm’n [2010] NSWCA 331 (Austl.); Shafron v Austl. Sec. & 
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lawyers failed.  The legal work these lawyers so carefully did to distance 
the James Hardie parent from its subsidiaries, and from any shareholder 
perception that it was still tainted by large future liabilities, was all undone 
when Bernie Banton (a social justice campaigner and victim of asbestosis 
and mesothelioma), the unions, and the New South Wales government 
succeeded in getting the parent to pay the shortfall, despite the company’s 
not being legally required to do so.  James Hardie fought the pressure to 
cover the remaining claims kicking and screaming.10
James Hardie’s outside lawyers were among those criticized by the 
special government commission of inquiry (Commission) set up to 
scrutinize James Hardie’s actions.  During hearings convened to investigate 
the incident, Commissioner David Jackson wondered aloud:  “Why didn’t 
someone stand back and say, ‘This is just too hot’?”
 
11  He concluded in his 
report that it was “disturbing” that none of Hardie’s professional advisors 
and officers, especially its outside advisors, “expressed any view of the 
merits [or rightness] of the underlying transaction[]” and that none of them 
had informed their client that “separation was unlikely to be successful 
unless the [Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (MRCF), 
established to cover asbestos-related claims] was fully funded, and that this 
was required to be rigorously checked.”12  Jackson was surprised that 
lawyers from Allens Arthur Robinson (Allens), a large and well-respected 
corporate firm, did not raise the question of the adequacy of the funding 
earlier than they did.  Ultimately Jackson concluded that James Hardie’s 
law firm had not engaged in intentional wrongdoing and had therefore not 
breached any law or professional conduct rule, although they may have 
been negligent and in breach of their duty of care to James Hardie.13
 
Invs. Comm’n [2011] NSWCA 110 (Austl.).  Both the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission and the two executive officers sought leave to appeal to the High Court of 
Australia (the highest court in Australia).  This was granted in May 2011 and arguments 
were heard in October 2011.  Judgment is pending at the time of this writing. 
  
Nevertheless he appeared to harbor some vestige of hope that a 
 10. See Helen Anderson, Veil Piercing and Corporate Groups—An Australian 
Perspective, 2010 N.Z. L. REV. 1, 7–8; Paul von Nessen & Abe Herzberg, James Hardie’s 
Asbestos Liability Legacy in Australia:  Disclosure, Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Power of Persuasion, 26 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1, 36 (2011) (describing the pressure that 
needed to be brought to bear by the New South Wales government, unions, asbestos disease 
sufferers and the general public before the James Hardie group “accepted that the desired 
elimination of its asbestos legacy had been unsuccessful”).  As a result of the Commission of 
Inquiry, the New South Wales government threatened to legislate to make the James Hardie 
group liable unless they were able to negotiate a satisfactory arrangement for compensation 
of everyone.  Unions threatened a boycott of James Hardie products, and James Hardie 
received bad publicity from the campaigning of unions, and asbestos disease sufferers and 
their families before an arrangement was finally negotiated.  On December 1, 2005, the 
company effectively agreed to undo its 2001–02 restructuring and reestablish its liability to 
compensate victims of asbestos. See Marcus Priest, Buck Stops with New Local Unit, AUSTL. 
FIN. REV., Dec. 2, 2005, at 5. 
 11. Elisabeth Sexton, Allens Warned on Supine Behavior, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(July 11, 2004), http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/07/11/1089484242541.html?from=
storylhs.  
 12. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 547–48, ¶¶ 29.14, 29.16. 
 13. Id. at 456, ¶ 25.91. 
2350 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
corporation’s advisors, especially its lawyers, would demonstrate some 
professional autonomy and ethical judgment, and would resist succumbing 
to its client’s commercialism and profit-orientation.  Jackson appeared to 
believe that lawyers would act consistent with their ethical concerns about 
their client’s activities, even when such actions were not required by 
professional conduct rules. 
This Article considers whether this faith in professional autonomy is 
feasible or forlorn.  We do not consider this question from a normative or 
ethical point of view, but rather from a sociological perspective.  As we 
show, arguments for reform (or renewal) of the professional ethics of 
commercial lawyers assume a particular sociology of the legal profession—
one that sees professionalism as a distinct set of institutional arrangements 
for an ethical professional community with unique advantages over 
markets, business organizations, and government bureaucracies14
This is in contrast to an alternative, critical sociology of the legal 
profession that explains the rise of professionalism as going hand in hand 
with the rise in fortunes of the business of law and of global capital itself.  
Indeed, in this account, the discourse of professionalism and the business of 
law are interdependent, and the relations between the profession of law and 
global capital mutually constitutive. 
—albeit 
one that might be deplorably in decline. 
We embark on this task with a conceit:  we take as our starting point 
C. Wright Mill’s humanistic vision for sociology—to educate individuals to 
avoid being “falsely conscious of their social positions.”15  Mills argues 
that, while individuals often feel that the circumstances of their daily life 
are their own problems alone, the “sociological imagination” connects their 
personal troubles to public issues so that they can understand that their 
personal problems are shared by others and can only be solved by change to 
the structure of the groups and societies in which they live.16
We begin by considering the sociology of the legal profession through 
the eyes of one of James Hardie’S outside lawyers, David Robb, a junior 
partner at Allens, who was on several occasions deeply disturbed by how 
“hot” the deal was.  The conceit we propose is that he might be interested in 
using the “sociological imagination” to deal with his misgivings about 
James Hardie’s actions.  In order to denote when we enter the world of 
speculation, we will refer to him by his initials, DR, only.  In this Article, 
we do not seek to explain what might motivate a lawyer in David Robb’s 
situation to develop and use a sociological imagination.  Our interest in this 
Article is what the sociological imagination would reveal about this 
situation, assuming someone is motivated to use it.
 
17
 
 14. See Julia Evetts, The Sociological Analysis of Professionalism:  Occupational 
Change in the Modern World, 18 INT’L SOC. 395, 403–04 (2003). 
 
 15. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 5–8 (1959). 
 16. Id. at 171–87. 
 17. Some to whom we presented this Article urged us to investigate what might motivate 
or drive DR to become a sociological citizen.  This may be a fruitful line of inquiry, but not 
one we pursue here. 
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In Part I, we outline two occasions during which Robb tried, 
unsuccessfully, to exercise professional autonomy.  We then describe the 
frustrations that could motivate someone in his position to engage the 
“sociological imagination”—to reconsider his role as a lawyer and the 
options available to him.  In Parts II and III, we outline two alternative 
sociologies of the legal profession—a sociology of expert community as the 
source of professional autonomy, and a critical sociology of the discourses 
of professionalism and their interdependence with the business of law—that 
might enlighten our protagonist’s personal troubles, and how they would 
apply to this situation. 
In Part IV, we argue that while there are insights to be gained from both 
sociological accounts of the predicament of contemporary commercial 
lawyers like DR, it is the second version that provides a more accurate, and 
therefore ultimately more empowering, version of the social milieu in 
which DR finds himself enmeshed. 
I.  THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION AND THE LAWYER WHO FOUND HIS 
PROFESSIONAL ROLE TOO “HOT” TO HANDLE 
A.  Too Hot to Handle? 
Between February 2001 and March 2003, James Hardie’s corporate 
management restructured its family of companies so that that all the group’s 
asbestos liabilities would end up vested in a separate entity, the MRCF, 
together with a fixed amount of funding for compensating asbestos 
claims.18
The first occasion arose in February 2001, when Allens lawyers, 
including David Robb, attended a crucial meeting at which the company’s 
Board approved isolating James Hardie’S asbestos liabilities in the MRCF.  
Subsequently, the foundation was cut adrift from the James Hardie group 
without adequate funding to compensate all those who would be legally 
entitled to compensation.  During the fateful February meeting, James 
Hardie’s Chief Executive Officer, Peter Macdonald, and General Counsel, 
Peter Shafron, urged the Board to vote to create the MRCF.  At the time, 
the company’s officers permitted the Board to make its decision based on a 
  At two points during this period, David Robb attempted to raise 
concerns about the adequacy of the funding. 
 
 18. Before February 2001, the James Hardie group’s main legal responsibilities for 
asbestos compensation related to claims against two subsidiary companies owned by the 
parent company, JHIL.  These two companies, Amaba Pty Ltd. and Amaca Pty Ltd., had 
made asbestos products from 1937 until 1987 (under various names).  In February 2001 
JHIL transferred ownership of Amaba and Amaca to a new trust, the MRCF.  They also gave 
the MRCF A$293 million to meet future compensation claims.  At the same time, Amaba 
and Amaca indemnified JHIL for any further asbestos liabilities. See JACKSON, supra note 2, 
at 8, ¶ 1.7.  This meant that JHIL would not be liable in the future for asbestos-related 
claims.  There is controversy about the exact extent to which JHIL, as the holding company 
would nevertheless have been liable in relation to the asbestos claims, since the asbestos was 
produced and sold by its subsidiaries (Amaca and Amaba).  But JHIL had accepted that it 
had some responsibility to provide for asbestos compensation claims, at least as long as it 
still owned Amaba and Amaca. 
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flawed report that understated potential future claims and withheld 
important data that would have given the Board a more realistic idea of the 
funding the MRCF was likely to need.19
Immediately before the meeting, David Robb discovered that the James 
Hardie parent company had not provided Trowbridge, the actuarial firm 
charged with calculating future liabilities, with the most recent claim 
numbers to use for its calculations.
 
20  A cautious lawyer by disposition, 
Robb’s “mind began racing.”21
Robb, a junior partner new to James Hardie’s account, phoned Shafron, a 
former partner with Allens himself.  Shafron assured him that the new data 
would not make any difference.
  He wondered how Trowbridge’s report 
could be current without including the most recent figures. 
22  Although Robb was dissatisfied with 
Shafron’s response, he did not do the “logical thing”23 and go directly to the 
actuarial consultants.  Instead he spoke to his senior partner, Peter 
Cameron, and together they called Macdonald.24  During the call, Shafron 
was in Macdonald’s office, and joined the conversation.  Shafron simply 
reiterated his earlier position, that Trowbridge had indicated that it did not 
need the most recent numbers.25  Macdonald, meanwhile, assured Cameron 
that the foundation would be fully funded.26
Despite Robb and Cameron’s concerns, the outside lawyers said nothing 
during the board meeting.  The presence of the company’s outside counsel 
at the meeting was essential to give the Board’s decision legitimacy.  
During his subsequent testimony before the Commission, Shafron 
commented that the Board had insisted on hearing external advice in favor 
of each step in the process, and did not completely trust its internal lawyer 
and the other company officers.  Throughout the meeting, as the Board 
discussed and then approved the transaction, the lawyers failed to voice 
their concerns about relying on the Trowbridge report.  Robb considered 
raising the issue, but decided not to after consulting Cameron.  His position 
 
 
 19. The Board’s decision to fund the Foundation with A$293 million was based on the 
Trowbridge Report, an actuarial report, estimating the likely amount needed to cover the 
James Hardie asbestos liabilities.  However, this report was based on dated data and other 
inaccurate methodologies, and $293 million would not be enough to pay out all of Amaba 
and Amaca’s asbestos liabilities.  Shafron had an updated “draft” report, and was aware of 
the problems with the Trowbridge Report, but chose not to make this information available 
to the Board.  Allens’ lawyers advised JHIL on creating the Foundation, and raised concerns 
about the Trowbridge Report’s old data, but Shafron and Macdonald asserted that the report 
was adequate, and the Foundation would be sufficiently funded. See HAIGH, supra note 1, at 
262–63, 269–71, 281–82. 
 20. Id. at 262–65. 
 21. See id. at 262–63 (including various notes from Robb’s own files, which had been 
read during the Jackson inquiry).  It is unclear whether Haigh’s account is based only on the 
Jackson inquiry transcripts, or whether he interviewed Robb himself.  Haigh gives a lot of 
detail from Robb’s point of view; Robb has not given evidence of any of these matters in 
subsequent court hearings, or publicly commented since the Jackson Inquiry. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 262. 
 24. Id. at 263. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
2012] THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 2353 
was that the Allens lawyers were present in the event questions arose.  “We 
were available for questions to be asked of us.  No questions were asked of 
us and so we did not say—we did not raise it.”27
In subsequent months, Cameron and Robb went about creating the legal 
transactions and notices necessary to implement the Board’s decision.  All 
the while, Robb continued to “fret that Trowbridge’s update had been 
anything but up-to-date.”
 
28
In the summer of 2001, six months after the MCRF had been established, 
it was already apparent to its directors that it was facing a substantial 
shortfall in the funds available to cover the asbestos liabilities of the James 
Hardie subsidiaries, due to its initial underfunding.  As the directors of the 
MCRF obtained updated information on recent claims, they realized that the 
original amount allocated to the foundation had been based on incomplete 
claims data, and that the shortfall had been predictable at the time the 
foundation had been created.  Although the original agreement had 
contemplated that the MCRF would cover asbestos-related claims through 
the next two decades, it now looked as if the foundation would be insolvent 
within nine, or even as little as four, years.
  Robb attempted on a second occasion to raise 
concerns in late 2002, when James Hardie’S corporate restructuring 
severing the James Hardie parent from the foundation was complete, and 
the foundation was left unable to obtain further funds from the James 
Hardie parent. 
29  MCRF’s directors insisted 
that James Hardie needed to contribute additional funds.  In response, 
James Hardie claimed that the directors were not properly managing the 
Foundation and “was adamant that no further substantial funds would be 
made available to the Foundation, and that it had taken all proper steps at 
the establishment of the Foundation.”30
Between October 2001 and March 2003, the James Hardie group 
continued to restructure itself.  To reduce the company’s tax liabilities, the 
James Hardie parent group assets were transferred to a new parent company 
based in Amsterdam, James Hardie Industries NV (JHINV).  The former 
parent company, James Hardie Industries Ltd. (JHIL) was left as a non-
operating shell company, with net assets of A$20 million.  As part of the 
restructuring, JHIL also issued partly paid shares to JHINV, the new Dutch 
parent.  These shares gave JHIL the ability to call on funds up to the value 
of A$1.85 billion from JHINV, and would be available to cover the 
Foundation’s shortfall if it prevailed in its claim that, under the original 
agreement, the Foundation had been underfunded.
 
31
In the lead up to the restructuring, however, Allens and JHIL had 
discussed the possibility that these partly paid shares would be cancelled at 
some time in the near future.  According to Commissioner Jackson, while 
there was no “fixed intention” to cancel the partly paid shares at this stage, 
 
 
 27. Id. at 269. 
 28. See id. at 281. 
 29. See id. at 295. 
 30. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 12, ¶ 1.22. 
 31. See HAIGH, supra note 1, at 284–86. 
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“it was, in effect, the ‘operating assumption’ on which both management 
and the Board were proceeding” that it would occur within a year or so of 
the restructure. 32
The agreement between JHIL and JHINV had to be approved by the 
N.S.W. Supreme Court in order to ensure that the interests of shareholders 
and creditors of JHIL were protected (under N.S.W. law, this was a 
“scheme of arrangement”).
 
33  In court, JHIL’s lawyers stated that the A$20 
million and the funds available from the partly paid shares would be 
available to the MRCF to meet the asbestos liabilities of JHIL’s former 
subsidiaries if necessary.34
In the fall of 2002, the decision was made to cancel the partly paid shares 
and sever the relationship between the two companies completely.  Robb 
began to fret again.  He became concerned that Justice Santow, who had 
approved the transaction, had been misled.  Robb himself had assured 
Santow that the partly paid shares would be available “at any time in the 
future and from time to time.”
  Allens and JHIL did not mention to the court 
the concerns about the MRCF’s solvency that had already been voiced, nor 
the possibility that the partly paid shares would be cancelled.  Permission 
for the restructure was granted. 
35
Robb was so worried that he did something completely out of the 
ordinary:  he drafted an unsolicited memo to the parent company’s officers 
discussing the implications of having informed Santow that the shares 
would be available to cover future liabilities of the company, so that these 
considerations would be taken into account in the decision to cancel the 
partly paid shares.  Before Robb could finalize his opinion letter, he went 
on vacation.  He left the draft to his partners to complete. 
  Now the shares were going to be 
eliminated. 
When he came back, his unsolicited and highly unusual advice had been 
changed beyond recognition.  The final document reassured the James 
Hardie executives that the risks of canceling the shares were minimal. 
B.  The Sociological Imagination and the Socially Educated Agent 
At this point, let us imagine that DR, still fretting about what he could 
have done differently, turns to scholarly writing on the role of the 
contemporary legal professional.  Vaguely remembering that first year 
sociology had taught him something about how the “sociological 
imagination”36
 
 32. See JACKSON, supra note 
 could help him reevaluate his “private troubles” as “public 
issues” with broader explanations (and perhaps solutions) than those 
available inside his own individual capacity, he turns to the sociology of the 
legal profession, and to socio legal writing on large law firms in particular. 
2, at 453, ¶ 25.80. 
 33. See id. at 559, ¶ 30.27. 
 34. See HAIGH, supra note 1, at 286; JACKSON, supra note 2, at 431–33, ¶¶ 25.21, 25.22. 
 35. See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 428–29, ¶ 25.16. 
 36. See generally MILLS, supra note 15. 
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Some might see this as an attempt to rationalize his actions:  “Society 
made me do it.”  But we shall interpret his attempt to find an understanding 
(and perhaps an answer) in this direction more charitably—it is part of the 
impulse to understand how the individual fits with his or her social milieu 
and the wider society.37
DR shows the instincts of the “reflective practitioner.”
 
38  He realizes that 
sustainably excellent individual professional practice involves a constant 
process of reflection and learning in action, in order to reframe, re-imagine, 
and constantly seek to improve one’s own judgments and practices.39
This is a good test of sociological theory:  can it illuminate and provide 
understanding for the individual dilemma of DR if he were willing to 
engage with it?  And does it provide an account that will empower DR to go 
beyond understanding to action, while still recognizing the relationally 
interdependent nature of individual capacity for action? 
  DR’s 
instinct tells him, however, that this is not a matter merely of reflection on, 
and reframing of, his own individual practice.  Rather, his situation is a 
matter of the collective practices of others in his law firm, with the practices 
within the client corporation, and the broader history and social structure in 
which both firm lawyers and James Hardie executives are situated. 
II.  DEPROFESSIONALIZATION:  “CAPITAL AS TEMPTER” 
A.  Professional Community and Professional Autonomy 
DR finds a considerable “handwringing” literature in scholarly writing on 
the ethics of the legal profession decrying the descent of corporate lawyers 
and law firms into crass commercialism under the “temptation” of global 
competition and global capital.40  In this literature, “capital is cast as the 
villain, subverting the professional from the true exercise of his or her 
calling.  Lawyering in itself is conceived as good and pure, but as distorted 
by a growing association with and dependence on big business.”41
 
 37. See id. at 8; see also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 19 (1984). 
  
Commercial lawyers are therefore exhorted to show ethical judgment, moral 
courage, and above all, professional autonomy to reverse the moral decline 
evident in their relations with clients, their relations with professional 
colleagues within firms, and in their moribund attempts at professional self-
regulation. 
 38. See generally DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER:  HOW 
PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 4–20 (1983). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:  FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 4–7 (1993); Robert W. Gordon, Portrait of a Profession in Paralysis, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 1427, 1454 (2002) (reviewing DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:  
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000)); see also infra notes 56–59 and accompanying 
text. 
 41. Maureen Cain, The Symbol Traders, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD:  
TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 15, 25 (Maureen Cain & Christine Harrington eds., 
1994). 
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In reviewing this literature, DR notes that it assumes a special function 
for lawyers—and professionals more generally—in modern society.  In 
decrying the corrupting influence that commercial values have on 
professionalism, this literature implicitly opposes the moral regulation of a 
professional community to the chaos and self-interest of the market—a 
theme that was earlier conceptualized by Émile Durkheim in his 
posthumously published essay on professional ethics.42  This theme was 
further developed by Talcott Parsons,43 and most recently by Eliot Freidson 
and others who counterpose professional interactions not only to market 
logic but also to bureaucratic rationality.44
B.  Sociology of Professional Community Beyond Market and the State:  
Durkheim, Parsons, Freidson 
  In juxtaposing professionalism 
to markets and bureaucracies, these foundational accounts of 
professionalism in social theory conceptualize professionalism as an 
institution that cultivates ethical responsibility, and autonomy, in a way that 
these other forms of organizing work cannot do. 
Durkheim provided one of the best arguments for this approach in his 
lectures on professional ethics.  Durkheim’s thesis was that we cannot trust 
market forces, or state regulation, to inculcate ethics.45  Ethics must be the 
concern of sufficiently cohesive self-regulating occupations, which teach 
their members to look away from their own self-interest, and rather, toward 
the whole community, and thus develop the general disinterestedness on 
which moral activity is based.46
Durkheim argued that self-regulatory communities, which socialize 
people into ethical behavior and discipline undesirable conduct, are the best 
means to achieve the regulation necessary.  According to Durkheim, this 
was precisely how craft guilds have been historically organized.  When 
large-scale industry emerged in the nineteenth century, however, it fell 
outside the guild.  At the time Durkheim gave his lectures on professional 
ethics and civic morals, the only remnants of the moral regulation of the 
guilds were the self-regulating professional communities. 
 
Durkheim suggested that this professional, or guild, genre of institution 
be extended to the whole of economic life as a solution to the evils of 
unrestrained capitalism.  Under his approach, the state would sponsor and 
oversee new cooperatives that would be responsible for industry regulation.  
 
 42. See generally ÉMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS xxv 
(Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1958). 
 43. See generally id.; Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS 
IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34 (1954) [hereinafter Parsons, The Professions]; Talcott Parsons, 
A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra, at 
370 [hereinafter Parsons, A Sociologist]. 
 44. See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN:  THEORY, PROPHECY, AND POLICY 
(1994); ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM:  THE THIRD LOGIC (2001). See generally MARK 
TRAVERS, THE NEW BUREAUCRACY:  QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ITS CRITICS 139, 151–55 
(2007). 
 45. See DURKHEIM, supra note 42, at 12–13. 
 46. See id. at 23–24. 
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Durkheim argued that the state would encourage public-interest-oriented 
industry regulation or co-regulation that would allow civic communities, 
such as those that survived among the professions, to develop in all fields of 
work.  Although Durkheim emphasized the need for state regulation in 
every occupation, he was mindful that such state initiatives would also play 
a role in shoring up traditional professional communities, which, he 
recognized, were highly vulnerable to penetration by market logic. 
Durkheim did not single out professions as a special site for the 
development of a public-minded ethos.  Rather, he assumed that there was, 
or should be, a “craft” behind all worthwhile activities in economic life, and 
that in order to sustain the integrity and inherent morality of that craft, there 
needed to be something akin to a professional community regulating it.  
Durkheim saw his challenge as re-conceptualizing the institutions 
underlying occupation-based communities of pre-industrial society to 
respond to the novel demands of industrialization.  For Durkheim, there was 
no question of returning to historical guilds or applying traditional 
professional institutions to organize spheres of work.  The professions, he 
recognized, were relics of a bygone age.  Durkheim argued instead for the 
need to adapt the features of traditional civic communities to address the 
rapidly evolving conditions of post-industrial society.  While often read 
through a conservative lens, Durkheim was proposing that citizens engage 
in a self-conscious project to re-design the institutions of the state and 
society to meet new social needs.47
Later social theorists drew on Durkheim’s account to understand 
professions as an alternative mode of occupational organization, situated 
between market relations and government bureaucracy.  They departed 
from Durkheim in viewing certain occupations as having special expertise 
that made them uniquely suited to a professional mode of organization, 
based on principles of self-regulation.  Applied to the legal profession, this 
theory held that the state had struck an implicit bargain with the legal 
profession, under which it was permitted to regulate itself.  Self-regulation, 
it was claimed, was necessary because it was lawyers who understood the 
educational needs and workplace arrangements that were best suited to the 
application of legal expertise.   
  As we suggest below, this type of 
innovative spirit, which recognizes that social institutions need to respond 
to changing historical circumstances, should animate any efforts to 
refashion the institutions of law practice in a post-industrial age. 
The view that professions had a special occupational status was most 
fully developed in the work of Talcott Parsons.  For Parsons, professionals 
were different from members of other occupations or markets because they 
were “trained in and integrated with, a distinctive part of our cultural 
tradition, having a fiduciary responsibility for its maintenance, development 
and implementation.”48
 
 47. See Thomas L. Haskell, Professionalism Versus Capitalism:  R.H. Tawney, Emile 
Durkheim, and C.S. Peirce on the Disinterestedness of Professional Communities, in THE 
AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS 180 (W. Haskell ed., 1984). 
  Since professions were responsible for, and learned 
 48. Parsons, A Sociologist, supra note 43, at 381. 
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in, bodies of knowledge and practice of great value to society they were 
entitled to regulatory prerogatives to ensure they are suitably trained and 
certified to interpret, develop, improve and practically apply this tradition 
for the benefit of others.49  As Julia Evetts explained, “Parsons recognized, 
and was one of the first theorists to show, how the capitalist economy, the 
rational-legal social order (of Weber), and the modern professions were all 
interrelated and mutually balancing in the maintenance and stability of a 
fragile normative social order.”50
More recently, Eliot Freidson has sought to rehabilitate the idea of 
professionalism as a bulwark not only against the market but also against 
the bureaucratic modes of organization that characterize private business 
and the state.  Freidson argues that the knowledge developed and applied by 
professions, anchored in the exercise of discretionary judgment, continues 
to be important to solving the complex social problems of our day.  
According to Freidson, the monopolistic tendencies of professions—their 
insistence on controlling educational and training requirements and the 
organization of the workplace—are necessary conditions for the 
deployment of professional expertise.  Permitting professions to control the 
markets for their services, Freidson suggests, will allow them to develop 
forms of expertise and service orientation so that they may fruitfully 
address the practical issues that are arising at the turn of the twentieth 
century. 
 
C.  Applying the Sociology of Professional Community to Law 
A number of sociologists of the legal profession have adopted a similar 
approach to the sociology and ethics of the profession.  They argue that 
society through the state does, and indeed must, enter into a “social 
bargain” with the legal profession in which the profession can define its 
own professional expertise and maintain its own professional autonomy.  In 
return the legal profession takes primary responsibility, as it must, for 
sustaining and advocating the integrity of the legal process and the rule of 
law.51  The state and civil society might enter into dialogue with the 
profession to make adjustments to the social bargain from time to time, but 
overall the value of professional community must be recognized for its role 
in preserving the rule of law and the justice system.52
The most sociologically nuanced and in-depth empirical studies of the 
legal profession from this broad perspective have come from the long term 
collaborative and comparative project led by Terence Halliday and Lucien 
 
 
 49. See id. at 372. 
 50. Evetts, supra note 14, at 400. 
 51. See generally TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY:  LAWYERS, STATE 
CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 370–71 (1987); Andrew Boon, Professionalism 
Under the Legal Services Act 2007, 17 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 195 (2010); Alan Paterson, Self-
Regulation and the Future of the Profession, in LAW’S FUTURE(S):  BRITISH LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 29 (David Hayton ed., 2000). 
 52. See CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAWYERS:  REGULATION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 140–
73 (1999) (assessing this literature and suggesting a revision to the approach it takes, in order 
to make the legal profession more accountable to broader access to justice concerns). 
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Karpik to study the ways in which the legal occupations (which they call 
“the legal complex” to include lawyers, judges, and others) in different 
countries and globally have influenced the development of political 
liberalism and the promotion of basic legal freedoms.53  DR notes that this 
strand of social theory assumes a professional mode of relations with 
clients, a form of workplace organization, and a self-regulatory regime that 
can be distinguished from capitalist, commercial, bureaucratic, or 
hierarchical business modes of work organization.  It sees “professionalism 
as a normative value system in the socialization of new workers, in the 
preservation and predictability of normative social order in work and 
occupations, and in the maintenance and stability of a fragile normative 
order in state and increasingly international markets.”54
DR appreciates the appeal of this traditional account; it was implicit, if 
inchoate, in his decision to pursue law and occasionally surfaced in broad 
outline as he pursued his studies and began practice.  He wonders, however, 
whether it continues to be viable in the early twenty-first century in the 
context of corporate practice.
 
55
D.  Relations with Clients 
  He considers relations between clients and 
their lawyers, the structure of large firms, and the possibility of a robust 
self-regulatory regime to determine whether they afford opportunities for 
the independent expert judgments that are the mark of “professionalism.” 
DR observes that in his relations with clients, there is not much space for 
him to exercise discretionary judgment.  Looking back on his experience as 
a transactional lawyer, he has difficulty recalling instances when he played 
a broader counseling role, or saw more senior partners assume this role.56
 
 53. See generally FATES OF POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE LEGAL COMPLEX IN THE BRITISH 
POST-COLONY (Terence Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 2011); FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL 
FREEDOM:  COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
(Terence Halliday et al. eds., 2007); LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM:  EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTIETH 
CENTURIES (Terence Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997); cf. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT 
GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:  INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996); RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING 
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY:  ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995). 
  
Clients made clear that they were not interested in such advice, and lawyers 
were consequentially not eager to give it.  DR also thinks back on the 
pressures within the firm to develop a book of business, increase profits, 
 54. See Evetts, supra note 14, at 404. 
 55. See Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law 
Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 415–20 (1985). 
 56. See generally ROBERT NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER:  THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988); Robert Nelson, The Discovery Process 
as a Circle of Blame:  Institutional, Professional, and Socio-economic Factors that 
Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 773 (1998); Robert Eli Rosen, Problem-Setting and Serving the 
Organizational Client:  Legal Diagnosis and Professional Independence, 56 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 179 (2001); William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity:  Lawyer 
Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2005). 
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and keep the most important clients happy.57
Reading the literature on recent trends in corporate practice, DR observes 
that his firm is not atypical.  Increased competition for clients has created 
intense pressures for lawyers to breach their duties to the court, the law, and 
the wider public interest for the sake of clients.  Contemporary commercial 
law firm attorneys have increasingly become handmaids to (global) capital.  
Firms are profit-oriented, competitive, and, in some cases, over-dependent 
on a small number of powerful, rich clients.
  This anxiety makes it difficult 
to give unwelcome advice to clients.  They want to hear how to do what 
they want, not that they cannot. 
58  Increasing external 
competition among law firms to attract and retain clients may lead to law 
firm cultures where at least some lawyers might feel they can only achieve 
partnership, financial rewards, and social esteem by proving how 
aggressively they can represent clients in litigation, or, in transactional 
lawyering, by designing innovative ways to get around the law and to 
protect partisan client interests.59
 
 57. See MILTON C. REGAN, EAT WHAT YOU KILL:  THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 
291–324 (2004); Kimberly Kirkland, Ethical Infrastructures and De Facto Ethical Norms at 
Work in Large US Law Firms:  The Role of Ethics Counsel, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 181, 195–98 
(2008); Suzanne Le Mire, The James Hardie Case and Its Implications for the Teaching of 
Ethics, in INNOVATION IN CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION:  EDUCATING LAWYERS FOR THE 
FUTURE 25, 25–33 (Bronwyn Naylor & Ross Hyams eds., 2007); Milton C. Regan, Taxes 
and Death:  The Rise and Demise of an American Law Firm, in 52 STUDIES IN LAW, 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY:  LAW FIRMS, LEGAL CULTURE, AND LEGAL PRACTICE 107 (Austin 
Sarat ed., 2010); Milton C. Regan, Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1148–49 
(2005). 
  If mid-twentieth-century corporate 
lawyers ascribed to professional ideologies tied to furthering broader social 
ends, by the turn of the twenty-first century, the dominant approach was 
undiluted partisanship on behalf of the client.  Single-minded commitment 
to furthering client interests fit well with the market and organizational 
conditions of corporate practice.  In the current competitive atmosphere, a 
long-term client that was a steady source of substantial fees called the shots. 
 58. See Camille Cameron, Hired Guns and Smoking Guns:  McCabe v British American 
Tobacco Australia Ltd., 25 U.N.S.W. L.J. 768, 779–88 (2002); Gordon, supra note 40, at 
1432; David J. Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE:  
LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 94, 96–97 n.5 (Deborah L. Rhode 
ed., 2000) (citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY:  AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 
(1974)); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 9, 25–26 (2002); Simon, supra note 56, at 1; Eli Wald, Lawyers and Corporate 
Scandals, 7 LEGAL ETHICS 54, 54–58 (2004). See generally Marc Galanter & William 
Henderson, The Elastic Tournament:  The Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1867 (2008); Gerard Hanlon, A Profession in Transition?—Lawyers, The 
Market and Significant Others, 60 MOD. L. REV. 798 (1997). 
 59. See John Flood, Megalawyering in the Global Order:  The Cultural, Social and 
Economic Transformation of Global Legal Practice, 3 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 169, 182 (1996) 
(describing lawyers in big city law firms); Doreen McBarnet, Legal Creativity:  Law, 
Capital and Legal Avoidance, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD:  TRANSLATION AND 
TRANSGRESSION 73, 73–84 (Maureen Cain & Christine Harrington eds., 1994); Robert Eli 
Rosen, We’re All Consultants Now:  How Change in Client Organizational Strategies 
Influences Change in the Organization of Legal Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 639 (2002) 
(describing the changing use of lawyers by clients). 
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The close relations between lawyers from Allens, the in-house lawyer at 
James Hardie (an ex-Allens partner) and the executive management of 
James Hardie exemplified this dynamic well.  Allens had done legal work 
for James Hardie for over one hundred years.  The in-house lawyer was 
working with the CEO to manipulate the shape of the advice given by the 
external lawyers (and other professional advisors).  The focus was on 
shareholders and the place of James Hardie in a global network of business 
and shareholding, rather than on its embeddedness in the Australian 
community and its responsibilities to generations of workers, homeowners 
(renovators), and building occupiers who might be damaged by its products.  
James Hardie’S conceptualization of its relations with its asbestos liabilities 
(through the CEO and in-house lawyer) was an issue to be “risk 
manage[d]”60
E.  Relations Within Firms 
 through legal and actuarial strategies in order to present a 
good investment to the global market. 
DR considers whether his law firm is organized to permit lawyers to 
engage in discretionary judgment.  Despite being a partnership, Allens has a 
fairly robust bureaucracy; and lawyers are divided into groups with 
relatively narrow subspecialties.61  Here, too, DR notes that the 
organization of his firm reflects a trend.  Large corporate law firms organize 
and manage themselves increasingly like the large commercial firms they 
represent, creating a new mentality and institutions of lawyering focused on 
commercial and managerial rationality rather than value rationality and 
ethical judgment.62
Reviewing the literature, DR notes that current law firm organization is 
the result of a historical trend in the last decades of the twentieth century.  
During this period, law firms grew significantly and became geographically 
 
 
 60. See generally Robert E. Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Governance:  The 
Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2003).  In the papers for the relevant board 
meeting, the CEO was quoted as saying,  
We have developed a comprehensive solution to critical issues that James Hardie 
has been facing for over five years.  The solution should be implemented now to 
maximise improvements in shareholder value.  Although the plan is not risk free, it 
is recommended as providing the best outcome from the alternatives that are 
possible.  The objective is to position James Hardie for future growth and to 
eliminate legacy issues that would otherwise continue to detract from value 
creation.  
HAIGH, supra note 1, at 261. 
 61. See ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON, http://www.aar.com.au/index.htm (last visited Apr. 
21, 2012).  There is a page showing the firm’s specializations. People, ALLENS ARTHUR 
ROBINSON, http://www.aar.com.au/experts/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 62. See KRONMAN, supra note 40, at 271–314; Andrew Boon, From Public Service to 
Service Industry:  The Impact of Socialisation and Work on the Motivations and Values of 
Lawyers, 12 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 229, 252 (2005); James Faulconbridge & Daniel Muzio, 
Organizational Professionalism in Globalizing Law Firms, 22 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 7, 8 
(2008); Hilary Sommerlad, The Commercialisation of Law and the Enterprising Legal 
Practitioner:  Continuity and Change, 18 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 73, 74–77 (2011); Margaret 
Thornton & Joanne Bagust, The Gender Trap:  Flexible Work in Corporate Legal Practice, 
45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 773, 774–77 (2007). 
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dispersed.  To manage these large far-flung organizations, firms imposed 
bureaucratic forms of control.63  These included setting up practice groups 
with hierarchical reporting structures and assigning nonlawyers to 
managerial positions.  As the focus on financial returns increased, law firms 
adopted controls to track individual lawyer and practice group performance, 
measured by number of hours billed, revenue earned, and profitability by 
partner.  Over time, the meaning of professionalism “shifted from the 
accumulation of incommensurable professional accomplishments to the 
currency of ranking in metrics of size, profit, and income that signif[ied] 
importance, success, and power and [were], at most, indirectly correlated 
with achievements measured by avowed professional values.”64
Increased bureaucratization and compartmentalization narrowed the 
zones within which lawyers might be able to exercise expert discretion.  
Even if lawyers like DR imagined that they might want to act as 
independent counselors and provide ethically grounded advice, the material 
and organizational resources to do so have all but disappeared.
 
65  In 
regulating the minutiae of the delivery of professional services, hierarchical 
structures have eroded the discretionary space necessary to allow their 
lawyers to function as autonomous professionals.  The ascendancy of 
managerialism has “deprofessionalized” legal work and colonized the space 
in which lawyers might otherwise have been trusted to act in contextually 
appropriate ways using professional judgment and values.66
It was true that David Robb was a partner, not merely an associate, in a 
law firm pyramid beholden to the bidding of senior lawyers with more 
clout.
 
67
 
 63. Tanina Rostain, Self-Regulatory Authority, Markets, and the Ideology of 
Professionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 169, 187 (Robert Baldwin et 
al. eds., 2010). See generally Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 
  Nevertheless he was a very junior partner; in 2001 he had been a 
62, at 8; Flood, supra note 
59, at 182. 
 64. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 58, at 1882; see also text accompanying infra 
note 98. 
 65. David M. Brock, The Changing Professional Organization:  A Review of Competing 
Archetypes, 8 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 157, 157–64 (2006); Christine Parker et al., The Ethical 
Infrastructure of Legal Practice in Larger Law Firms:  Values, Policy and Behaviour, 31 
U.N.S.W. L.J. 158, 173 (2008). 
 66. See TRAVERS, supra note 44, at 35–58; Sommerlad, supra note 62, at 74; Hilary 
Sommerlad, The Implementation of Quality Initiatives and the New Public Management in 
the Legal Aid Sector in England and Wales:  Bureaucratisation, Stratification and 
Surveillance, 6 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 311, 313–14 (1999) [hereinafter Sommerlad, 
Implementation]; Hilary Sommerlad, Managerialism and the Legal Profession:  A New 
Professional Paradigm, 2 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 159, 159–85 (1995) [hereinafter Sommerlad, 
Managerialism]; see also Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk 
Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909, 1910–12 (2006); cf. Ashly Pinnington & Timothy Morris, 
Archetype Change in Professional Organizations:  Survey Evidence from Large Law Firms, 
14 BRIT. J. MGMT. 85, 85–88 (2003). See generally Timothy J. Hargrave, Moral 
Imagination, Collective Action, and the Achievement of Moral Outcomes, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
87 (2009). 
 67. See Lillian Corbin, How “Firm” Are Lawyers’ Perceptions of Professionalism?, 8 
LEGAL ETHICS 265, 277–78 (2005); Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale:  An Empirical Study 
of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 
69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 252–53 (2000); Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms:  
The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631, 665–68 (2005). 
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partner for less than a year and was relatively new to the lucrative James 
Hardie account.  Robb knew that his fortunes within the firm presumably 
depended on his billings and on keeping clients happy; even as a partner, he 
was still very much part of a hierarchy. 
Before the fateful board meeting of 2001, DR did not feel that he had the 
authority within the firm’s reporting structure to check the actuarial figures 
without consulting with his senior partner, Cameron.  Cameron was 
similarly constrained.  Despite being there to provide independent outside 
advice to the company, when a question about the adequacy of the 
information provided to the Board arises, he was not emboldened to go 
directly to Trowbridge, but feels compelled to work through James Hardie’s 
CEO and in-house lawyer.68
When Robb tried to provide broader ethically informed advice to alert his 
client of the risks of cancelling the partially funded shares, his 
memorandum was subsequently revised to shift its focus.  An anodyne 
version was provided to the client that contained enough discussion to 
protect the law firm should the Board’s decision backfire, but reassured the 
client that the path it wanted to pursue was acceptable.  The memo’s 
revision foreclosed the possibility of discussing the broader ramifications of 
leaving the Foundation substantially underfunded.  Despite being a partner, 
Robb was still a cog in a much bigger law firm machine. 
 
F.  Professional Organization and Self-Regulation 
At this stage in his exploration, it is clear to DR that current competitive 
pressures—which have lawyers subservient to corporate client demands and 
have transformed law firms into mirror images of the corporations they 
represent—render it impossible for him to provide broad ethical advice to 
his clients.  DR is skeptical that he can counteract these trends acting alone; 
his experience has shown him otherwise.  He considers, however, whether 
there might be some practical power in a broader conception of the 
independent advisor at the level of the organized bar.  Perhaps professional 
regulation might be reshaped, he wonders, to give this role greater 
prominence.  Recognizing the need to counteract market forces, lawyers 
might collectively decide to advance self-regulatory initiatives that 
safeguard spheres for discretionary decision making, and shift the emphasis 
from single-minded partisan norms to public minded counseling. 
Surveying the landscape does not give DR much reason to be optimistic 
that the organized bar will be able to use self-regulatory mechanisms to 
enhance the counseling role.  For one, the history of the organized bar 
suggests that it has been ineffective in imposing or enforcing ethics 
standards that went against lawyers’ commercial interests.  More 
importantly, in recent years, DR notes, self-regulation has increasingly been 
supplanted with regulation by government authorities.  In some instances, 
new government mandates have limited the capacity to engage in 
discretionary decision making by turning professional aspirations into 
 
 68. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
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legally binding requirements and imposing specific mandates.  In addition, 
as the global reach of law firms expands, lawyers may be increasingly 
treated as generic “service providers” under international trade 
agreements.69
To stave off regulatory threats by external authorities and keep bar 
authorities at bay as well, corporate law firms have attempted to institute 
internal self-regulatory systems.
  With increased global competition and the assertion of 
jurisdiction over corporate legal services by transnational regulators, the ties 
between corporate practice and the domestic self-regulatory regimes under 
which corporate lawyers had traditionally practiced are likely to weaken. 
70  These have included appointing law firm 
general counsel, creating opinion committees, and imposing ethical 
“infrastructures.”71  DR has some doubts about how effective these 
mechanisms have been.  He recalls the wake of the McCabe tobacco 
litigation scandal, during the course of which firm lawyers were discovered 
to have destroyed important documents that were relevant to litigation.  
Large law firms and professional associations in Australia announced a 
campaign for large law firms to respond by making sure they had ethics 
partners in place72—something most large law firms claimed to already 
have.  According to Parker’s research, however, a significant disconnect 
exists between the views of law firm partners, who believe they have ethics 
partners and open-door ethics policies; and the views of more junior 
lawyers who are not aware of these ethics management systems within law 
firms and do not feel empowered to use them.73
 
 69. See Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession:  The Impact of 
Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers,” 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189, 189–93; 
Laurel S. Terry, GATS’ Applicability to Transnational Lawyering and Its Potential Impact 
on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989, 1005–06, 1048 
(2001). 
  To DR, self-regulation at 
the firm or organized bar level does not offer a promising avenue.  While a 
large literature exists calling for ways to reinvigorate professional 
community and self-regulation at the firm and professional level as a 
 70. John Flood, The Re-landscaping of the Legal Profession:  Large Law Firms and 
Professional Re-regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC. 507, 516–17 (2011). 
 71. Ethical infrastructure refers to how law firms’ formal and informal management 
policies, procedures and controls, work team cultures, and habits of interaction and practice 
influence and constrain ethical practice.  The term “ethical infrastructure” was coined in Ted 
Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems:  Reflections on How Law Influences the “Ethical 
Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 246 (1998).  For further development 
of this idea, see Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm 
Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335 (2003); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. 
Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms:  A Call for 
Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (2002); Parker et al., supra note 65. 
 72. See PARKER & EVANS, supra note 2, at 15–16, 67, 213; Cameron, supra note 58, at 
793–95; Christine Parker, An Opportunity for the Ethical Maturation of the Law Firm:  The 
Ethical Implications of Incorporated and Listed Law Firms, in RE-AFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS 
96, 111 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010). 
 73. See generally Christine Parker & Lyn Aitken, The Queensland “Workplace Culture 
Check”:  Learning from Reflection on Ethics Inside Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
399, 418–25 (2011). 
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bulwark against commercialism,74
III.  DISCOURSES OF PROFESSIONALISM:  SUPPORTING THE BUSINESS 
OF LAW AND THE BUSINESS OF CAPITAL 
 DR doubts that attempts to resurrect 
professional norms of the past are likely to succeed given the realities of 
twenty-first century practice. 
A.  Critical Sociologies of Professional Work 
DR searches further and finds another strand of more critical sociological 
literature that explains the rise of “professionalism” as going hand in hand 
with the rise in fortunes of the business of law, and of global capital itself.  
As this scholarship argues, the discourse of professionalism and the 
business of law are interdependent, and the relations between the profession 
of law and global capital mutually constitutive. 
This critique of the profession was first set out in the market control 
theory developed by Magali Larson,75 and adapted and applied by Richard 
Abel76 to the American and English legal professions.  During the 1970s 
and 1980s, this was the dominant sociological perspective on the 
professions.  This approach saw the professions as autonomous collective 
organizations devoted to securing the economic and social interests of their 
members by controlling entry into the profession, and competition from 
within and outside the profession.  Lawyers deployed the ideology of 
professionalism as a discursive strategy to ground their authority to 
delineate a realm of expert practice, impose educational barriers and ethical 
standards and prevent competition by nonlawyers.77  Under market control 
theory, the “professional project” is a collective mobility project to gain 
economic power and social status.78
 
 74. See, e.g., Parker et al., supra note 
  Traditional professional claims of 
disinterested public service and of a social bargain mandating self-
regulation form part of an ideology that justifies and obscures the social 
structural inequalities caused by professionalism and inspires individual 
professionals in their efforts.  The profession provides a clear educational 
and career path for individual members to achieve power and prestige 
65, at 172–73; Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost:  
Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273 (1998); 
see also TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES:  LAWYERS, 
ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER MARKET 1994–2004 (Forthcoming M.I.T. Press 
2013). 
 75. MAGALI SAFRATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:  A SOCIOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS xvi (1977). 
 76. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); RICHARD L. ABEL, THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1988); 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:  THE COMMON 
LAW WORLD (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988); 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:  
THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 22–26 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988); 3 
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:  COMPARATIVE THEORIES 80–153 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. 
Lewis eds., 1989); PAT O’MALLEY, LAW, CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY:  A SOCIOLOGY OF 
AUSTRALIAN LEGAL ORDER (1983) (applying the market control theory to the legal 
profession in Australia); DAVID WEISBROT, AUSTRALIAN LAWYERS (1990). 
 77. TERENCE J. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER 45 (1972). 
 78. LARSON, supra note 75, at xvi. 
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within a tightly regulated structure that ensures, through socialization and 
material and nonmaterial rewards, lawyers’ continued contributions, 
deliberate or not, to the collective project and their ongoing commitment to 
a unified profession.79
With the elimination of anti-competitive barriers in the 1980s and 1990s 
in the United Kingdom, United States, and Australia, and the accelerated 
competition among law firms for corporate clients, the professional 
monopoly account seems less apposite.  DR does not feel that there is that 
much insulation from competition in his job at Allens.  Within the firm, 
there is ruthless competition to be among the top billers, and to be put in the 
best sections to work with the best (most lucrative) clients.  The firm as a 
whole is well aware of the imperative to compete for these lucrative clients 
who can change law firms whenever they please. 
 
Yet the discourse of “professionalism”—its claims to specialist 
knowledge, to normative value and autonomy, and to the centrality of 
discretionary judgments based on expertise—remains powerful.  A number 
of more recent sociologies of professions (each from a different theoretical 
perspective) take seriously one or another of the ways that discourses of 
expertise, normative value, and autonomy around claims to professionalism 
are deployed to serve the goals of global capital and, more recently, neo-
liberal governance, and are in turn constituted and shaped by them. 
Each of these critical sociologies of the professions also take seriously 
the micro-sociology of professionals’ work lives.  They examine what 
professionals do on a day-to-day basis and seek to connect micro-level 
social action with the broader social structures of the profession and its 
relations with capital and the state.80
Again DR considers how these theories illuminate lawyers’ relations with 
clients, with colleagues within the firm, and in terms of professional 
organization and self-regulation:  in each case, there is a critical story about 
how professionalism is not what it makes itself out to be.  
“Professionalism” does not necessarily provide the disinterested, communal 
basis for ethical practice that the Durkheim/Parsons/Freidson approach 
assumes.  Rather, professionalism is socially constructed in order to help 
achieve the interests of lawyers themselves, their clients and/or their 
employers.  Achieving these insights may mean forsaking the 
“professional” norms to which DR at one time aspired.  But in recognizing 
the ways in which professionalism is socially constructed and inevitably 
tainted, there is the possibility for DR to see the ways in which his own 
agency, together with others, is involved in making what the profession is 
and does, and can therefore be involved in re-making what it does and what 
interests it serves.  Pursuing the critique of traditional professionalism, 
 
 
 79. Id. at 70–74. 
 80. On the importance of this sort of micro-macro linkage in theories of the legal 
profession, see Sida Liu, Legal Profession as a Social Process:  A Theory on Lawyers and 
Globalization (Nov. 2011) (unpublished paper presented at Berkeley Center for the Study of 
Law Fiftieth Anniversary Conference) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
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moreover, provides a more realistic basis for re-thinking what 
professionalism can mean. 
B.  Relations with Clients:  
Lawyers as “Conceptive Ideologists” for Global Capital 
In criticizing professionalism in corporate practice as having succumbed 
to crass commercial values, the hand-wringing literature assumes that there 
is an inherent positive normative value to lawyering and does not critique 
the notion of professionalism itself.  Maureen Cain questions this 
fundamental premise.  As she observes, it precludes 
any serious questioning of the law as such or of the role of lawyers as 
traders in legal symbols.  Certainly there could be no room for a 
suggestion that the relationship with capital is constitutive of lawyering.  
Rather, reforms may be necessary, after which lawyering will be back on 
tracks for social good.  By not questioning the commodity to be purveyed 
by law work, the approach reinforces the assumption that it is an obvious 
and unquestionable good.81
Cain switches the game by seeing lawyers as “traders in legal symbols” 
who translate “the objectives and demands of clients into an acceptable 
legal discourse” and, in doing so, “expand [and tilt] that discourse.”
 
82
Cain
 
83 argues that lawyers’ work is creative.  They invent abstract 
categories and relationships within which clients can achieve their 
particular objectives.  According to Cain, because the legal profession has 
grown up with capital and largely serves capital as its clients, the law itself 
is largely tilted toward the interests of capital.  Professionalism and 
professional autonomy were created to bolster and legitimate the law 
business.84  Through this process, lawyers were able to take the specific 
interests of capital and frame them in objective universalistic terms.  As 
Cain further observes, “[P]rofessionalism secures the legitimacy and 
‘neutrality’ of authoritative legal inventions on behalf of capital, as it makes 
professional ideal discursive goers between two key configurations:  capital 
and the state, the economy and the polity.”85
Applying Cain’s insight to his own experience, DR recognizes that—as a 
lawyer and along with other lawyers—he is involved in constituting the 
system that is causing the problem for him.  A lawyer may give advice to 
James Hardie that the law is clear that it can use limited liability to shield 
itself from liability.  But the law of limited liability and the circumstances 
in which it can and cannot be used have been created by lawyers in the 
course of acting on behalf of their clients and in the course of their more 
general law reform work.  Lawyers create corporations (and limited 
liability) and schemes of arrangement, and they draft the documents and 
 
 
 81. Cain, supra note 41, at 25–26. 
 82. Id. at 32. 
 83. Id. at 33. 
 84. See generally SHAMIR, supra note 53. 
 85. Cain, supra note 41, at 37. 
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representations that apply them to particular cases, including the James 
Hardie case.  It is the creative work of lawyers in the past that has created 
the legal strategies that allow James Hardie to do what it now does to 
“separate” itself from its liabilities.  It is also this creative work and the way 
it has already tilted86
At the same time, DR recognizes that James Hardie’s success was not 
guaranteed by the creative work of its lawyers.  Indeed, James Hardie (and 
its lawyers) was called to account for its failures to abide by social 
expectations that it would compensate victims of asbestos exposure. DR 
further recognizes that his own role as a conceptive ideologist for capital is 
not inevitable.  The ultimate failure of the James Hardie scheme suggests 
that there is space and resources for critical agency. 
 the law toward the interests of a client like James 
Hardie that imposes “professional” constraints on DR.  Having taken on the 
James Hardie representation, DR is obligated by professional norms to 
represent the company to the limits of the law.  If it is possible to use and 
create legal strategies that defer to its wish to shed as best it can its liability 
for its historical role in producing asbestos in its quest to become a global 
company, then DR feels professionally constrained to do so. 
C.  Relations Within Firms:  Discipline and Governmentality 
Cain’s analysis shows how the content and substance of the work that 
lawyers do as apparently autonomous professionals is tilted toward the 
interest of capital as their major clients.  Recent critical scholarship in the 
sociology of the professions focuses on the ways that the organization and 
governance of professional work serves bureaucratic or capitalist goals.  
Professionalism may appear to provide an alternative to market and 
bureaucracy, as Durkheim, Parsons, and Freidson argued.  This literature, 
applying Foucault’s insights on discipline87 and governmentality,88 argues, 
however, that the discourse of “professionalism” is used to govern the 
conduct of those who are defined as professionals as a regulatory 
technology of self-control.89
 
 86. See Timothy Kuhn, Positioning Lawyers:  Discursive Resources, Professional Ethics 
and Identification, 16 ORGANIZATION 681, 697 (2009) (noting the “tilt” toward orthodox 
acceptance of commercialism and corporate power in the array of discursive resources about 
their professional identity available to junior lawyers in a large commercial law firm). 
  Whereas Cain uncovered how 
“professionalism” is constructed by the profession itself in order to be able 
to serve capital, this Foucaultian perspective reveals the ways that the 
contemporary meaning of professionalism is being reconstructed by some 
 87. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:  THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON (1977). 
 88. See generally THOMAS LEMKE, FOUCAULT, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND CRITIQUE 
(2011); THE FOUCAULT EFFECT:  STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY (Graham Burchell, Colin 
Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991); Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing Economic Life, 
19 ECON. & SOC’Y 1 (1990); Nikolas Rose, Pat O’Malley, & Marianne Valverde, 
Governmentality, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 83, 83 (2006). 
 89. See generally Valerie Fournier, Stories of Development and Exploitation:  Militant 
Voices in an Enterprise Culture, 5 ORGANIZATION 55 (1998); Christopher Grey, Career As a 
Project of the Self and Labor Process Discipline, 28 SOC. 479 (1994); Sommerlad, supra 
note 62. 
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within the profession—partners, managers, supervisors, and the human 
resources managers who are entering law firms—to control other 
professionals such as employee lawyers and junior partners like DR. 
Evetts and Fournier apply this analysis to the experience of “new 
professions” such as social service workers in government bureaucracies 
and management consultants in hierarchically organized private services 
firms.90  They argue that in these occupations, employers use the discourse 
of professionalism, and its association with the complex discretionary 
judgment and autonomy exercised by traditional well-established 
professions such as medicine and law, to motivate employees to discipline 
themselves and to bring about occupational change and rationalization that 
further an organization’s interests.91  Thus the discourse of professionalism 
“serves to inculcate ‘appropriate’ work identities, conducts and practices,” 
and thus brings with it a “disciplinary logic which inscribes ‘autonomous’ 
professional practice within a network of accountability.”92
According to Evetts, the promise that this “professionalism” will bring 
the opportunity for discretion and autonomy is illusory: 
 
[I]n most if not all organizations, the reality of professionalism that is 
actually envisaged in new and existing occupations includes financial 
constraints and budgetary devolution; often a reduction in personnel but a 
work force which is disciplined and more highly trained and 
credentialized; an enlarged and expanded work role and the need to 
demonstrate the achievement of externally (and often politically) defined 
targets.93
Evetts suggests that this “organizational” professionalism—that is, 
“professionalism” that is a “discourse of control” aimed at managing 
workers to meet organizational goals—applies largely in the new 
professions, especially in health and education where “new public 
management” is common.  She explains that “[i]t incorporates rational-legal 
forms of decision-making, hierarchical structures of authority, the 
standardization of work practices, accountability, target-setting and 
performance review and is based on occupational training and 
certification.”
 
94
 
 90. Evetts, supra note 
  Evetts further suggests that traditional “occupational 
professionalism” involving trust relations between clients and professionals, 
complex discretionary decision making, and control over work conditions, 
continues to exist in historically well-established professions such as law 
and medicine.  Evetts contrasts this discourse of “occupational 
professionalism,” which she suggests continues to be created and controlled 
by professionals themselves, with the discourse of “organizational” 
14, at 395–415; Julia Evetts, Short Note:  The Sociology of 
Professional Groups:  New Directions, 54 CURRENT SOC. 133, 138–40 (2006); Fournier, 
supra note 89, at 55–80. 
 91. Evetts, supra note 90, at 139. 
 92. Evetts, supra note 14, at 406 (citing Valerie Fournier, The Appeal to 
“Professionalism” as a Disciplinary Mechanism, 47 SOC. REV. 280, 280 (1999)). 
 93. Evetts, supra note 14, at 408. 
 94. Evetts, supra note 90, at 140–41. 
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professionalism, deployed as a governance mechanism by the organization 
to further its interests.95
The evidence suggests, however, that organizational professionalism has 
already penetrated spheres once considered to be the bastions of 
occupational professionalism.
 
96  In large law firms, as we have already 
suggested above, there is a pervasive governmentality that has taken the 
form of an exclusive focus on competition and economic profit as the 
measures of value, through technologies of control such as time-based 
billing (with junior lawyers often explicitly competing against each other 
for billing the most hours at the highest rates for the most lucrative clients) 
and profits per partner (with league tables published in financial newspapers 
and the legal media showing how different firms compare).97  As far as the 
individual employee lawyer or junior partner is concerned, this rationality 
of governance is felt in a series of disciplinary practices that monitor and 
control the minutiae of their every working minute—or every six minutes in 
the case of billing sheets.  Billable hours and profits per partner become 
commensurable98
“Professionalism” is a resource in this technology of control. The 
governance of conduct is constructed through professional ethical 
obligations to clients.  As Sommerlad observes, “[T]he customer-service 
ethic is also the main lever in the harmonization of employee interests with 
those of the employer, rationalizing and legitimating a suite of demands on 
labour . . .”
 and professionalism expressed through a particular 
conceptualization of the type of service the client requires. 
99  Quoting an interview subject, she notes that demands on 
junior lawyers include an open-ended commitment to “take the work and 
the client very seriously and absolutely kill themselves to deliver a good 
service” regardless of the personal sacrifices required.100
Thus the pervasive ideology of “serving the client” and “adversarial 
advocacy” as “professional” pursuits
 
101
 
 95. Id. 
 combine with the disciplinary 
controls of time sheets and billable hour rankings to colonize the meaning 
of professionalism for junior lawyers.  Sommerlad suggests that young 
lawyers internalize a sense of the entrepreneurial professional self-driven by 
 96. See generally Sommerlad, supra note 62; Sommerlad, Implementation, supra note 
66 (discussing managerialism and the over-regulation of legal aid practice in the United 
Kingdom); Sommerlad, Managerialism, supra note 66; Hilary Sommerlad, Some Reflections 
on the Relationship Between Citizenship, Access to Justice, and the Reform of Legal Aid, 31 
J. L. & SOC’Y 345 (2004); Thornton & Bagust, supra note 62. 
 97. See Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 62; Galanter & Henderson, supra note 58; 
Christine Parker & David Ruschena, The Pressures of Billable Hours:  Lessons from a 
Survey of Billing Practices Inside Law Firms, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming 2012).  
 98. See Wendy Nelson Espeland & Mitchell Stevens, Commensuration as a Social 
Process, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 313, 315–18 (1998). 
 99. See Sommerlad, supra note 62, at 86. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See PARKER & EVANS, supra note 2, at 225. See generally William H. Simon, The 
Ideology of Advocacy:  Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 
30–32. 
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rational calculus and single-minded commitment to client interests.102  
Sommerlad’s work on the recruitment practices of large commercial law 
firms shows how this plays out in the selection and training of young 
lawyers, including their dress, their table manners, and their ability to 
engage in appropriate social chit chat, all essential to possessing the right 
social capital to “serve” elite clients and fit in at the law firm.103
Even as professionalism is constructed by supervisors as a technology of 
control, the “organizational” version of professionalism (to adopt Evetts’s 
term) may still be contested by lawyers who seek to deploy a more 
traditional conception of professionalism as a resource to act autonomously 
and engage in action that furthers justice.
 
104
D.  Professional Self-Regulation and Organization:  
Contests over Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction 
  We explore this possibility in 
greater depth through a third strand of critical sociology in Part IV of this 
Article. 
Whereas a “social bargain” approach inspired by Durkheim, Parsons, and 
Freidson assumes a fairly stable ethical role for the legal profession in 
advancing the rule of law in society, critical sociologies of the professions 
suggest that the ethical and political roles of the profession are defined in 
ongoing contests within and among professions over the suitability of 
different forms of expertise to solve particular problems and change over 
time and place.  On this view, the meaning of professionalism is the result 
of complex interactions between the ambition for commercial success and 
the competition to define “professional” expertise and the values or 
“symbolic capital” that attach.  Applying Bourdieu’s insights, Andrew 
Abbott has shown that different professions construct their expertise, and 
hence their professional “jurisdiction” over a particular field of work, 
through competition with other professions over the applicability of their 
expertise to social and personal problems.105
A number of scholars have used a Bourdieusian lens to study the role of 
lawyers in constructing and restructuring legal regimes.  Pursuing this 
approach, Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have investigated contests over 
the discourses through which legal work and the legal field is framed in the 
  The symbolic capital of each 
profession—who is deemed to be an expert in a field and therefore can 
profit from it—is derived from these jurisdictional contests among 
professions. 
 
 102. Sommerlad, supra note 62, at 74–75; see also Boon, supra note 62, at 252. 
 103. See Sommerlad, supra note 96; Hilary Sommerlad, Minorities, Merit, and 
Misrecognition in the Globalized Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2481, 2504 (2012) see 
also DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 53, at 18–19; Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, The 
Economy of Legal Practice as Symbolic Market, 10 ECON. SOC.:  EURO. ELECTRONIC NEWS. 
8, 10–11 (2009). 
 104. This is what the literature cited in the previous section does. See supra notes 40, 56–
74.  This “handwringing” literature in effect engages in the internal contestation over the 
meaning of professionalism rather than externally observing what is going on. 
 105. See generally ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS (1988); PIERRE 
BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (1980). 
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emerging area of international commercial arbitration.106  In the same vein, 
they have explored the professional and political contests among lawyers 
and economists to shape the export of neoliberal economics and human 
rights laws to Latin American and Asian states,107 and considered 
competition over global legal markets between accounting and law firms.108
Similarly, Robert Rosen’s research on the interactions among in-house 
lawyers, external lawyers, and in-house corporate business managers 
working to address a corporation’s legal problems demonstrates how 
contests between and among these three groups end up framing situations as 
involving legal problems or business problems.
 
109
In a historical study, Ronen Shamir adopts a Bourdieusian approach to 
investigate the construction of elite lawyers’ professional jurisdiction 
during the New Deal.  Echoing Cain’s account of corporate lawyers as 
conceptual ideologists for capital,
  Although Rosen does 
not explicitly use Bourdieusian analysis, consistent with this approach, his 
research shows that the characterization of a particular problem is fluid over 
different contexts and contingent on the results of power struggles among 
the different professionals serving the corporation. 
110 Shamir argues that lawyers functioned 
as “double agents”111 protecting the prerogatives of capital through “their 
defense of their own perceived autonomous domain.”112
 
 106. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 
  Lawyers’ ability 
to represent their clients “depends on the degree to which they are able to 
53, at 4. 
 107. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS:  LAWYERS 
IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE (2010); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:  LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO 
TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002).  John Flood’s work on global law firms fits 
well into this style of analysis, although Flood explicitly uses institutional theory rather than 
Bourdieusian analysis. See generally Flood, supra note 70.  For an analysis that explicitly 
combines institutional theory with Abbott’s Bourdieusian style analysis of the role of 
professional work in institutional change, see Roy Suddaby and Thierry Viale, Professionals 
and Field-Level Change:  Institutional Work and the Professional Project, 59 CURRENT SOC. 
423, 425–26 (2011). 
 108. Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, The Confrontation Between the Big Five and Big 
Law:  Turf Battles and Ethical Debates as Contests for Professional Credibility, 29 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 615, 616 (2004). 
 109. See generally ROBERT ELI ROSEN, LAWYERS IN CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING 
(2010); Rosen, supra note 56. 
 110. SHAMIR, supra note 53, at 169–71.  As Shamir and Cain were writing at the same 
time as each other, they do not refer to each other’s work. 
 111. Id. at 62.  Shamir cites Gordon here for this term. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ideal 
and the Actual in the Law”:  Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870–
1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS:  LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 53 (Gerard W. 
Gawalt ed., 1984). 
 112. SHAMIR, supra note 53, at 171.  He goes on to comment:   
  It was the structural bias of this autonomous system, not substantive ideological 
inclinations, that created the bond between the court-centered legal system and 
laissez faire capitalism.  The assertion of law’s autonomy—with its ever-present 
tendency to depoliticize social relations—systematically denied law’s 
sociohistorical roots, the unequal social accessibility to legal remedies, the 
prominence of corporate and business law in legal education, and the structural 
advantages of corporate lawyers in developing areas of the law in ways that 
reflected the demands and interests of their corporate clients.  
Id. 
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appear as guardians of the law and as experts who are responsible for 
ensuring the ordered functioning of the legal system as a whole,”113 and not 
as “mere hired guns.”114
Shamir emphasizes, however, that in defending the value of the legal 
domain they controlled, lawyers were not simply advancing the interests of 
their clients.  Rather, in asserting the boundaries of a distinct legal field to 
which they laid claim, lawyers were furthering their own collective interests 
in drawing material and non-material benefits from the exercise of expert 
authority.  As Shamir notes, “lawyers must constantly persuade relevant 
audiences—clients, legislators, state authorities, and the public at large—
that they own a distinct form of symbolic capital.”
 
115
Lawyers’ attempt to create symbolic capital around an apolitical expert 
field, whose discourse is framed in neutral legal values, is of necessity in an 
unstable relationship with their commitment to serving the demands of 
capital.  As Shamir shows, this strain can become visible during times of 
crisis, such as the New Deal, when a competing administrative law regime 
was proposed to deal with the economic and social disruption precipitated 
by the stock market crash and the Great Depression.  Shamir suggests that 
corporate lawyers’ resistance to “the dejudicialization of the legal system,” 
which was framed in terms of rule of law values, “was fueled not only by 
their individual obligations to corporate clients but also by their collective 
interest in arresting the tendency of the state’s legislative and administrative 
apparatuses to usurp law-producing and law-controlling functions.”
 
116  In 
arguing for the centrality of courts in the American legal system, corporate 
lawyers sought to protect their own symbolic capital, which would allow 
them to continue effectively to represent corporate clients while at the same 
time distancing themselves from the particular interests of their clients.117
Shamir’s approach illuminates recent corporate ethics scandals, which 
reveal a similar strain for lawyers between serving corporate interests and 
  
In defending the traditional American judicial system, the corporate bar 
locked horns with academic lawyers whose symbolic capital was tied up 
with creating and implementing novel administrative processes to address 
the unprecedented problems of the day. 
 
 113. Id. at 62. 
 114. Id. at 170. 
 115. Id. at 62–63; see also Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers:  The Organized Tax Bar 
and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 80 n.13 (2006). 
 116. SHAMIR, supra note 53, at 171. 
 117. Id. at 38 (“Whenever lawyers advance a cause in the name of law their identification 
with clients becomes a burden.  But when they try to transcend strict legalistic arguments, 
they immediately risk blurring the fragile line that separates law and politics, which at other 
times they are at pains to uphold.  Two basic tactics were used through which lawyers tried 
to symbolically distance themselves from their clients’ causes:  their rhetorical attempt to 
frame arguments in the name of public good and their attempt to mobilize the formal organs 
of the bar, presumably independent of client control, in order to articulate arguments in the 
language of value-free legal expertise.”). 
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creating symbolic capital around neutral legal expertise.118  These scandals 
exposed the instrumental purposes to which the law is put by large 
corporations—often in the most public and political style in the media and 
legislatures.  Jackson’s criticism in the James Hardie case of the 
professionals for failing to provide ethical advice can be read as suggesting 
that the professions involved, and the legal profession in particular, needed 
to work to shore up their symbolic capital, which had been weakened.  In 
the United States, Congress’s enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act119 in 
response to a wave of corporate scandals in the early twenty-first century, 
suggests that the corporate bar’s symbolic capital had been so diminished 
that it could no longer plausibly assert the claim that it was in a position to 
safeguard legal values.  The statute eliminated corporate lawyers’ discretion 
to address potentially fraudulent conduct by a corporate client, substituting 
a mandatory reporting up scheme.120
Further, Shamir’s analysis shows that the expertise, jurisdiction, and 
symbolic capital of the legal profession is socially constructed by the 
profession as a group.  It is always unstable and open to strain, and it is 
constructed as a result of contests both within the profession itself and in 
relation to other professions, clients, governments, and the public.  
Although Shamir’s approach emphasizes the contests among professional 
groups, his account suggests that despite structural constraints, there may be 
space to maneuver and engage in concerted action.  When mobilized, 
lawyers may be able to act to strengthen the symbolic capital of their 
profession. 
 
Thinking back on his experience, DR realizes that a source of his 
frustration was that within the hierarchy of the firm and relations with in-
house counsel for the client, there was little opportunity for him as an 
individual lawyer, a junior partner, to act to protect the symbolic capital of 
the profession.  The senior partners and in-house counsel with whom he 
worked seemed to have a slightly greater capacity to act on behalf of the 
profession to preserve its symbolic capital, but the critical sociologies of the 
profession give DR little scope to see his own experience of and aspiration 
toward “professionalism” as something that he can meaningfully engage 
with in the context in which he works.  At least one interpretation the 
critical sociologies of the profession, which emphasize the structural 
conditions of practice, suggests that his experience as a corporate lawyer 
was mostly foreordained.  Any motivation he has toward “professionalism” 
is illusory.  DR wonders whether the Durkheimian ideal of professional 
community, despite its lack of fit with current realities, would not be a more 
inspiring perspective for him to adopt in seeking ethical autonomy as a 
legal professional. 
 
 118. For example, take the analyses and critiques of the role of lawyers in various 
corporate ethics scandals. E.g., Cameron, supra note 58 (Tobacco litigation document 
destruction case). 
 119. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 11, 12, 15, 
18, 28, 29, and 49 U.S.C.) 
 120. See Rostain, supra note 63, at 189–90. 
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IV.  THE PROFESSIONAL AS SOCIOLOGICAL CITIZEN 
The sociology of professional community appears to motivate and inspire 
an ideal of ethical autonomy, but it inadequately describes the nature of the 
power relations—or the power of the discourses—at work in the field of 
corporate power, and is therefore unrealistic.  The critical sociologies of the 
legal profession, on the other hand, illuminate important aspects of DR’s 
work life, but they are easily read as disempowering and dehumanizing.  
They do not account for the possibility that within the micro relationships 
of legal practice, DR feels some capacity to act—to write an unusual letter, 
to raise awkward questions. 
As DR reflects further, he begins to wonder whether he can combine both 
approaches to find, in Foucaultian terms, “possibilities of resistance” in the 
micropolitics of his everyday professional life.121  This means paying 
particular attention to critical sociologies of the legal profession in order to 
illuminate the relationship between DR’s problem and the way power is 
exercised within the specific domains he inhabits.122
In considering this possibility, DR turns to more recent research in 
regulation studies that suggests that actors can effectively use their 
embedment in relationships and networks for successful problem solving.  
In particular, DR considers the idea of the “sociological citizen,” which 
Susan Silbey offered to describe how sociological imagination might be 
used in practice to address various regulatory challenges.
  It also means 
deploying the discourses of professionalism made available by the 
sociology of professional community as a resource.  The critique of 
professionalism points out that “professionalism” was created to bolster and 
justify the law business.  Nevertheless, because professionalism draws on 
an autonomous legal realm, it also provides resources for lawyers to act 
creatively to resist and re-work power relations. 
123
Silbey and her co-authors develop the concept of “sociological citizen” to 
describe “the capacity to see relational interdependence and to use this 
systemic perspective to meet occupational and professional obligations.”
  Interested in 
applying the concept to his work life, DR begins to explore the conditions 
under which it might be possible for a corporate lawyer to use his or her 
sociological imagination to act as a sociological citizen. 
124
 
 121. See Jonathan Simon, Between Power and Knowledge:  Habermas, Foucault, and the 
Future of Legal Studies, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 947, 954 (1994); see also Cain, supra note 
  
41, at 41 (“One reading of Foucault says . . . wherever there is power there is resistance; at 
all points in the web of discursively constituted relations resistance is possible, changes can 
be made.”). 
 122. See Simon, supra note 121, at 957 (1994).  In discussing Foucault, Fournier 
emphasizes that in his view, “subjects are not just constituted through the strategies deployed 
from above” but “subjectivities, meanings and dispositions” can be “re-appropriated and 
transformed; they are liable to tactual realignment in the process of being consumed from 
below.” Fournier, supra note 89, at 74 (using the example of “militant” computing and 
information service graduates on the “periphery” of a professional services firm). 
 123. See generally Susan Silbey et al., The “Sociological Citizen” Relational 
Interdependence in Law and Organizations, 59 L’ANNEE SOCIOLOGIQUE 201 (2009). 
 124. Id. at 203.  
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Contrary to Mills, Silbey argues that the capacity to think systematically 
and relationally is not only available to the trained sociologist but is found 
among lay persons who are able to deploy institutional resources and 
engage with co-workers and colleagues to solve novel problems.  As she 
and her co-authors observe, “[T]he sociological citizen realizes that 
whatever the current configuration of that world, it is the outcome of human 
actions, connections, links among persons and things.  As a consequence, 
sociological citizens experience a sense of freedom to try things, 
experiment, intervene in organizations and arrangements where others 
would hesitate.”125
In reflecting on the sociological citizen, DR realizes that the concept 
bridges the divide between traditional accounts of professionalism, which 
assume that properly educated and socialized, and under appropriate 
organizational conditions, professionals can construct social institutions that 
serve human needs and critical sociologies that reveal the existing power 
relations that constrain human action.  More broadly, the concept links 
accounts of professional action based on methodological individualism—in 
which lawyers are characterized as either rational market actors or 
professionalized socialized experts—and those that rely on social 
structure—the firm or the professional community.  A sociological citizen 
understands her work and herself as a “link[] in a complex web of 
interactions and processes.”
 
126  She is able to reach beyond scripted 
responsibilities precisely by understanding the relationships, links, 
interdependencies, and collectivities that construct her world (and that we 
might pessimistically see as constraining it).127  At the same time, she also 
understands that her social world and the scripts that frame it are 
continually created and re-created by momentary as well as continuing 
human relations.128
A sociological citizen’s focus on the sociology of her situation—that is, 
the social links that make up her world—therefore make it possible for her 
to imagine the possibility of change because she sees dimensions of time 
and space in her social world.  In other words, she sees the way her social 
world has been constructed over time, and the way it differs from place to 
place in space.
 
129
Sociological citizens experience a sense of freedom to try things, 
experiment and intervene in organizations and arrangements. . . .  They 
are enabled by the awareness of human capacity as they may be 
simultaneously appreciating the constraints (on themselves and others) of 
the web of embedded relationships . . . by recognizing one’s location in an 
extended network of associations, a sociological citizen has an extended, 
  As Silbey emphasizes, 
 
 125. Id. at 203, 223. 
 126. Id. at 203.  For a different approach to analyzing the way legal professionals utilize 
their links and connections to achieve organizational goals, see EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE 
COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON:  THE SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION AMONG PEERS IN A 
CORPORATE LAW PARTNERSHIP (2001). 
 127. Silbey et al., supra note 123, at 223. 
 128. Id. at 203. 
 129. Id. at 204–05. 
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rather than constricted, set of opportunities (resources, schemas, persons) 
with which to fashion solutions to local problems.130
Silbey and her co-authors identify sociological citizens among 
organizational actors who are assigned the task of devising workable 
solutions to regulatory challenges.  In one example, they describe “Brian 
Jones,” an environmental risk manager at a research university.  Brian is 
assigned the task of designing a containment system for chemistry 
experiments that responds to two seemingly contradictory regulatory 
imperatives:  the first requires researchers working with chemicals to use 
large overflow containers to contain spillage; the second imposes minimum 
airflow requirements within the workspace to ensure ventilation.  As Silbey 
and her co-authors report, none of the high-level environmental experts to 
whom Brian reports takes responsibility for the problem or offers 
constructive solutions.  Brian, in contrast, is willing to experiment with 
different materials, shapes, and approaches.  After talking to colleagues and 
engaging in a little bricolage, he devises a prototype for a container stand 
using objects commonly found in the trash.  In his willingness to draw on 
organizational resources and engage in trial and error to find a solution, 
Brian acts as if his mission is synonymous with the university and its 
mission, in this case to pursue scientific research, while ensuring 
environmental health and safety.
 
131
In their second example, Silbey and her co-authors describe the actions of 
effective prosecutors working in the Brazilian Ministério Público.  Unlike 
prosecutors in the United States and Australia, these prosecutors enjoy a 
broad mandate to address civil, regulatory, and criminal matters, and 
significant autonomy from other branches of the state to effectuate their 
mission to “protect society, democratic values, and the Constitution.”
 
132  
Although many prosecutors frame their assigned cases as “business as 
usual,” occasionally a prosecutor will solve a multifaceted problem by 
drawing on legal resources, professional networks, and institutional 
mandates.133
Intrigued by these descriptions, DR wonders whether he might have been 
more successful at his firm if he had enlisted colleagues in the networks in 
  In one such instance, a prosecutor solved a problem with a 
squatter settlement by inducing a petrochemical producer who had engaged 
in illegal dumping to provide fencing materials to limit the spread of the 
settlement and persuading the squatters to dig ditches to obtain a consistent 
and much-needed water supply.  In another case, this same prosecutor used 
her connections to a local judge to order the transfer of squatters who had 
been occupying an environmentally sensitive area to a newly completed 
housing unit. 
 
 130. Id. at 223.  In a similar vein, Cain argues that we must remember that discourses 
“have constitutive potency but not primacy over relationships.  Relationships constitute but 
do not cause discursive practices.  It is necessary instead to think of reciprocal constitution 
and partially independent potencies.” Cain, supra note 41, at 45. 
 131. Silbey et al., supra note 123, at 210. 
 132. Id. at 210–11. 
 133. Id. 
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which he was embedded.  In writing his letter, Robb tried to behave as an 
autonomous individual professional, but did not do much at all to get other 
players in the situation on board with his concerns.  Instead, he acted alone, 
and within the normal hierarchical relationship with his own senior partner. 
Sociological citizens, DR observes, draw on relationships, networks, and 
organizational resources to devise solutions to seemingly intractable 
problems.  In order to exercise this sort of sociological action in corporate 
practice, it would be necessary for a lawyer like DR not only to have the 
sociological understanding and awareness of the power relations he lives 
with (to be sociologically “educated,” in Mills’s language) but also to 
know, understand, and be able to draw on the discourses and networks that 
“overflow” the micro-hegemonies in which he works.  On an organizational 
level, Robb might have been successful had he been able to mobilize the 
relationships within his firm.  His efforts might also have benefited from 
connections in the community, and with government officials, union 
leaders, and even lawyers for the opposing side.134
As he ponders these unrealized possibilities, DR wonders whether certain 
organizational settings facilitate “sociological citizenship” more than others.  
He notes that in Brian’s work setting, there is a “strong culture of 
collaborative decisionmaking [and] the hierarchical privileges and 
constraints that often impede individual initiative are muted.”
  These linkages might 
have provided discursive resources to reframe the problem of James 
Hardie’s asbestos liabilities to arrive at a more satisfactory solution. 
135  The 
Brazilian Ministério Público enjoys a broad mandate and is politically 
independent of other government agencies.  These circumstances allow 
prosecutors to see “the interconnect[ed], nested relations that constitute the 
social problem.”136  As members of a professional community with a 
common mission, they can share “information, experience and tactics 
across cases to build both local and more general solutions.”137
More fundamentally, DR notes, Silbey’s account of the sociological 
citizens is premised on the existence of “heterogeneous processes and 
modes of action” within an organization.  “Sociological citizens work 
among others who do the same jobs differently; the combination of 
divergent approaches serves as a check on the excesses of each.”
 
138
 
 134. Cf. Kuhn, supra note 
  
86, at 699. 
 135. Silbey et al., supra note 123, at 221. 
 136. Id. at 222. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 206–07.  Michel Callon makes a complementary argument from the point of 
view of the agent about the mechanisms by which heterogeneous networks facilitate the 
agent’s ability to act autonomously:   
 The capacity of an agent to make autonomous choices, that is to say, to 
make decisions which do not merely fall in line with the decisions made by 
other agents, is not inscribed in her nature; it coincides with the morphology 
of her relationships.  When she finds herself at the intersection of two 
networks which scarcely, if at all, overlap, the range of available options 
affords her with a large margin of manoeuvre.  She is even endowed with the 
possibility of considering action in terms of alternative choices and her 
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Delving more deeply into recent organizational literature, DR observes that 
Silbey’s account resonates with David Stark’s thesis that innovation in 
organizations requires “generative friction” among multiple “orders of 
worth.”139
As Stark observes, human beings are constantly confronted with 
decisions involving incommensurable frameworks.  “What 
counts? . . .  What is valuable and by what measures?” are recurring 
questions in our daily lives.
 
140  Stark argues that innovation arises in 
organizations that foster competing frameworks of valuation.  Such 
organizations have “heterogeneous criteria of organizational ‘goods.’”141  
Stark refers to these organizations as “heterarchies,” distinguishing their 
mode of governance from “a hierarchy of command and a conceptual 
hierarchy of cognitive categories.”142  Based on three workplace 
ethnographies, conducted in a machine shop in Budapest, a new media 
startup in Manhattan, and an arbitrage trading room, Stark argues that 
organizations that encourage their workers to engage in ongoing debates of 
worth “facilitate the work of reflexive cognition.”  According to Stark, the 
capacity to articulate “alternative conceptions of what is valuable” is a key 
adaptation for organizations to evolve to address changing circumstances.  
In the case of the trading room he studies, Stark suggests that it made higher 
than industry average profits, “not by access to better or timelier 
information but by fostering interpretive communities in the trading 
room.”143
For Stark, as for Silbey, the resources required for organizational 
innovation are material as well as discursive.  Investigating an arbitrage 
trading room, Stark observes that each desk is “an intensely social place.”  
Desks, which specialize in different types of trades, are placed adjacent to 
each other in one large room without partitions to encourage “active 
association among desks.”
 
144  Arbitrage trading requires “situated 
cognition,” which traders achieve by “drawing on the multiple sensors (both 
human and instrumental) present within the room.”145  In a similar spirit, 
Brian arrives at his solution to the hood ventilation problem by first talking 
to colleagues and then surveying the “offices, labs and spaces around the 
university.”146
Whereas organizations once relied on rationalization rooted in “processes 
of classification,” Stark argues that this logic is being augmented, and even 
 
 
faculty for arbitration is enhanced.  If, however, the relations are redundant, 
the agent is deprived of all ability to make choices. 
Michel Callon, Introduction:  The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics, in 
THE LAWS OF THE MARKETS 1, 9 (Michel Callon ed., 1998). 
 139. DAVID C. STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE:  ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN ECONOMIC 
LIFE 11, 19, 220 (2009). 
 140. Id. at 6. 
 141. Id. at 5. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 124. 
 144. Id. at 137. 
 145. Id. at 135. 
 146. Silbey et al., supra note 123, at 209. 
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supplanted, by the “alternative logic” of search.  Stark proposes search—
like classification, a fundamentally human activity—as an adaptive strategy 
for increasingly complex organizations to deal with increasingly complex 
environments and unpredictable change.  Stark emphasizes that “the most 
critical searches for organizations are the kinds that cannot be powered by 
search engines.”147  Search, in Stark’s sense, discovers the world only in 
the process of transforming it.  “In the most innovative of inquiries, there is 
not something out there waiting to be found.”148  The process of search, 
Stark proposes, is grounded in “reflexive cognition.”  As Stark emphasizes, 
this type of cognition is not that of the solitary thinker reflecting on her 
situation, nor is it an exercise involving distance or standing apart.  “It is a 
collective, collaborative, and sometimes conflictual social process that 
occurs in a situation . . . .  The situation provides the materials for reflexive 
cognition not because I rise above it but because I mix it up.”149
DR finds Stark’s conception of organizational innovation attractive, even 
beguiling.  Although he fully recognizes that traditional corporate firms are 
not likely sites to foster innovation, he concludes that legal practice affords 
multiple “orders of worth” rooted in professionalism and business.
  In Stark’s 
research, productive action occurs when people in organizations can 
generate new ideas by recognizing and recombining elements of plural, 
dissonant discourses, networks or frameworks of worth.  The difficulty—
and the key—is keeping these plural resources available despite their 
friction. 
150
At a minimum, DR realizes that the account of law seduced by capital, 
offered by the handwringing literature, is superficial and wrong in its 
analysis of his “problem.”  The deeper issue is the narrowing of the range of 
discourses about both “business” and “professionalism” that may be 
available to individual professionals to come to grips with the situations in 
which they find themselves.
  He 
can imagine a firm that provides the discursive and material resources to 
promote creative friction among these orders and foster innovative solutions 
to the novel issues of the day—maybe. 
151
 
 147. STARK, supra note 
  As DR sees, this impoverishment of 
discursive resources is exacerbated by the structure of corporate practice 
139, at 174. 
 148. Id. at 175. 
 149. Id. at 187. 
 150. Faulconbridge and Muzio use institutional theory to argue that professionals can 
retain some autonomy in the interstices between managerialism, commercialism, and 
professionalism.  Their investigation of very large, commercial law firms based in the United 
Kingdom challenged a “marked process of managerialization and commercialization 
threatening and displacing traditional notions of professional autonomy and discretion.” 
Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 62, at 10.  Instead they found that professional law firms 
were becoming “managed professional businesses” with layers of professionalism, 
commercialism, and bureaucracy “sedimented” together in productive ways.  This 
sedimentation included space for substantial professional autonomy, including in relation to 
traditional professional ethical concerns. 
 151. See Rostain, supra note 63, at 188 (“Whereas lawyers had at one time invoked a 
variety of professional ideologies, some of which were tied to furthering collective goods, 
the dominant ideology in corporate practice has become one of undiluted partisanship.”). 
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itself.  If DR is serious about his concerns, DR needs to develop his own 
capacities in this direction—the opportunities to draw on plural discourses 
and connections.  Whether these resources can be developed on an 
organizational level is an open question.  Moreover, there is no guarantee 
that they will not be manipulated by constituencies with different 
interests.152
CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude that the sociological understanding that will help DR is not 
the first alternative simpliciter.  That is, it is not a matter of whether law has 
become a business or a bureaucracy as opposed to a professional 
community.  Rather, the issue is the narrowing of the range of social 
connections and links that he and his colleagues experience in their 
everyday work lives, and the consequent narrowing of ideologies and 
discourses about both “business” and “professionalism” available to 
individual professionals to come to grips with the situations in which they 
find themselves.  That problem is not one of professionalism, but of agency.  
It is the diminishing opportunities for agency and structure to interact where 
discourses or orders of worth are singular rather than plural and 
relationships are few. 
 
 
 152. For example, Faulconbridge and Muzio seem to see a balancing out between 
commercialism and professionalism as possible and functional. See Faulconbridge & Muzio, 
supra note 62, at 10.  This “balancing” approach, however, is too naïve about the power of 
micro-hegemonies within law firms. 
